Measuring Changes in Source of Leader Support: The CHISOLS Dataset (with Michaela Mattes and Brett Ashley Leeds) in Journal of Peace Research 52(3): 259-267.
This article introduces the CHISOLS (Change in Source of Leader Support) Dataset, which identifies which leadership changes within countries bring to power a leader whose primary support is drawn from different societal groups than those who supported her predecessor. The dataset covers all countries of the world with populations greater than 500,000 from 1919-2008. We discuss the underlying rationale of our data collection, provide some brief information about the coding rules and procedures, and share some descriptive statistics. We also compare our newly collected data to existing data sources in order to demonstrate the unique contributions that CHISOLS can make to the study of domestically-motivated foreign policy change.
The Power of the Veto and the Power of Legitimacy: An Experiment of the Impact of UN Security Council Authorization Failure.” (with Atsushi Tago)
This paper examines the impact of “failed” authorization of the use of force by the United Nations Security Council on public support for military action. We hypothesize that the power of veto to change people’s perceptions is conditioned by a state casting it. An expected veto casted by the perpetual nay-sayer would not add information to the general public. However, if the veto is cast by an allied state of a proposer of the authorizing resolution, the negative vote functions as an information short-cut that signals the use of force is with variety of “problems,” and thus reduce public support for the military action. Our survey-based experiment provides strong evidence to support this hypothesis. Moreover, we also find that hawkish respondents, who usually tend to care less about the UN, are more affected by the ally’s surprise veto in the UN Security Council.
The Influence of Third Parties on Compliance with WTO Rulings
Do third parties in the WTO’s dispute settlement process have an impact on respondents’ compliance with WTO rulings? Based on existing arguments about states’ compliance with international obligations, I argue that third parties influence respondents’ compliance decisions through reputational concerns. With extra eyes in the room, third parties may encourage respondents’ compliance by making the reputational costs of non-compliance more real and immediate. Empirical analysis of WTO disputes initiated from 1995 to 2008 provides support for this argument. The findings show that as the number of third party participants increases, the respondents are more likely to comply in time and much faster. These findings imply an enforcement function of third parties.
How Do States Behave in an Overlapping Institutional Environment?
PTA Membership and Compliance with WTO Rulings
This paper examines how states’ memberships in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) affect their trade dispute settlement behaviors at the World Trade Organization (WTO). I argue that PTA memberships change the costs associated with how states settle disputes at the WTO. Specifically, if a defendant is in the middle of PTA negotiations with a WTO member state(s), this institutional environment raises the defendant’s cost of non-compliance with WTO rulings. Non-cooperative behaviors at the WTO would reveal the defendant as an unreliable PTA partner, which may protract ongoing PTA negotiations and delay ratification. Empirical analysis of the defendant’s compliance with WTO rulings (1995 to 2010) reveals that the increasing number of PTA negotiations that the defendant has had at the time of the ruling dramatically reduces its time to compliance, even after accounting for the selection of dispute escalation and the endogeneity of defendant’s participation in PTAs to its dispute behavior at the WTO.
The Effects of Foreign Audiences in WTO Litigation
This paper develops a theory that states use IOs to influence domestic groups in other IO member states by providing information. Examining dispute settlements at the World Trade Organization (WTO), I argue that a complainant state may have an incentive to use WTO litigation to inform pro-trade domestic groups in a respondent state of their own government’s protectionist policies that harm their economic interests, and thus mobilizing them to act. However, to what extent domestic groups influence government policies depends on domestic conditions. I hypothesize that the plaintiff may wait to bring a dispute case until the respondent’s leadership shifts in a favorable policy preference direction, especially when a leadership change is accompanied by changes in the leader’s support coalition. Empirical analyses of trade dispute initiations at the WTO (1995-2008) reveal that a complainant is more likely to litigate a WTO dispute when there is a change in the leader’s support coalition in the defendant state.
Leadership Turnover and the Initiation of Investment Dispute Arbitration
This paper investigates the timing of when investors use international arbitration by focusing on their expectation about policy change in host-countries. I argue that leadership turnovers accompanied by changes in leaders’ societal support provide a window of opportunity for policy change and therefore rectifying BIT violations.While national leaders tend to break BITs to protect the interests of their own constituencies, new leaders may place less emphasis on protecting those constituencies of previous leaders. Accordingly, the entry of new leaders who are supported by different constituencies from those of old leaders increases the likelihood that violations will be rectified, which in turn, encourages investors to use international arbitration courts. This hypothesis is empirically tested using newly collected data about investor-country disputes brought to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes from 1960 to 2011.